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optometrist or ophthalmologist. 1004 The Court determined that
eye care was related to the health and welfare of the citizens of
Oklahoma and as a result the legislature could regulate it. 1005
The legislature was within its police power to determine that poor
eyesight was the "evil at hand for correction" 1006 and that
requiring its citizens to see an optometrist or opthamologist every
time they needed new glasses was a rational way to correct this
evil. 10 07 The Court concluded that because there was a rational
basis for the legislation then there was no violation of the Equal
1008
Protection Clause. Therefore, the law was constitutional.
As the law currently stands there seems to be no notable
difference between an equal protection analysis under the Federal
Constitution and the New York State Constitution when no
suspect class or fundamental right is at issue. If the court can find
a rational basis for the legislation, be it expressly provided by the
legislature or inferred by the courts, no violation of the Equal
Protection Clause will be found.
FOURTHDEPARTMENT
Barth v. Crosson1 009
(decided December 29, 1993)
Plaintiffs, present and former family court judges of Onondaga
and Oneida Counties in the fourth department, brought an action
seeking to set aside the disparity between their salaries and those
of judges in twelve other New York Counties located in the first,
second, third and fourth departments. 10 10 The plaintiffs claimed
that the salary disparity, pursuant to New York Judiciary Law,
section 221-e, 10 11 which sets salaries by county for all New York
1004. Id. at 485.

1005.
1006.
1007.
1008.
1009.

Id. at 487.
Id. at 488.
Id. at 490.
Id. at 488.

607 N.Y.S.2d 200 (4th Dep't 1993).
__ A.D.2d.,
1010. Id. at ___, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
1011. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 221-e (McKinney Supp. 1993).
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family court judges, violated their equal protection of the laws
10 14
under the Federal 10 12 and New York State10 13 Constitutions.
The appellate division held that the plaintiffs' equal protection
rights had been violated because a salary disparity existed.
Additionally, family court judges of Erie and Monroe
Counties, 10 15 whose claims were not time barred, were entitled
to back pay. 10 16 As for the disparity between the plaintiffs'
salaries and the judges in the first and second departments, the
court held that there was no constitutional violation because there
was a rational basis for the disparity. 10 17 With respect to the
third department, however, the court held that the evidence
presented did not support an award of summary judgment for
either the plaintiffs or defendants. 10 18
The appellate division stated that the defendant had failed to
establish a rational basis for the salary disparity within the fourth
department. 10 19 The court, however, found that the higher cost
of living in the first and second departments provided a rational
basis for the disparate salaries between those departments and the
1020
fourth department.
The plaintiffs based their claim on the salary variations set
forth in section 221-e of the Judiciary Law. 102 1 Salaries for
Onondaga and Oneida family court judges have remained at the
low end of the ranges specified by the Judiciary Law. Plaintiffs
1012. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "No state shall make or enforce law which shall... deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
1013. N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 11. This section provides in pertinent part: "No
person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state ....
Id.
1014. Barth,
A.D.2d at
607 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
_

1015. Id. at

_,

,

607 N.Y.S.2d at 201-02. Erie and Monroe Counties are

both located in the fourth department.
1016. Id. at
,607 N.Y.S.2d at 201-02.
1017. Id. at ,607 N.Y.S.2d at 201-02.
1018. Id. at
1019. Id. at

N.Y.S.2d at 202.
607 N.Y.S.2d at 201. The court stated "[t]he duties and

,607
,

responsibilities of all plaintiffs are equivalent to those of Family Court Judges
in Erie or Monroe County and caseloads in the four counties are comparable.
Differences in the costs of living in those counties are insignificant." Id.
1020. Id. at
607 N.Y.S.2d at 201-02.
_,

1021. N.Y.

JUD. LAW

§ 221-e (McKinney Supp. 1993).
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successfully instituted the present action challenging the
constitutionality of the differentials. On appeal, the appellate
division followed the reasoning of Ponilio v. Crosson,1022 where
the Supreme Court, Oneida County, concluded that a rational
basis existed for the salary disparity. 10 2 3
In evaluating the disparity between family court judges in
several judicial districts, the court reviewed cost of living
differences, including the cost of acquiring a home and judicial
duties, such as responsibilities and caseloads to determine
whether the disparity was constitutional. 1024 In reviewing judicial
salaries and claims of disparity based on equal protection of the
laws, New York courts presume legislation is valid as long as
"the classification created by the statute is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest."1025 A test used by the New York Court
of Appeals in determining whether a judicial salary disparity is
constitutional, is to determine if there exists a "true unity
of... judicial
interest.., indistinguishable
by
separate
6 In Davis v. Rosenblatt, 102 7 the
102
geographic considerations.
court, used this test for the salary disparity existing among city
court judges, and stated that while "equal protection does not
require territorial uniformity, . . . a territorial distinction which
has no rational basis will not support a state statute." 10 2 8 In other
words, if the counties where the disparity exists are all located

1022. 1993 WL 560808 (4th Dep't 1993).
1023. Barth,
A.D.2d at
, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
1024. Id. at

,607

N.Y.S.2d at 201-02; see also Burke v. Crosson, 191

A.D.2d 997, 998 595 N.Y.S.2d 272, 273 (4th Dep't 1993); Edelstein v.
Crosson, 187 A.D.2d at 691, 695-96, 590 N.Y.S.2d 277, 278 (2d Dep't
1992).

1025. Davis v. Rosenblatt, 159 A.D.2d 163, 170, 559 N.Y.S.2d 401, 405
(3d Dep't 1990) (stating that city court judges successfully appealed on the
issue of salary disparities set forth by the New York State Judiciary Law).
1026. See Weissman v. Evans, 56 N.Y.2d 458, 463, 438 N.E.2d 397, 399,
452 N.Y.S.2d 864, 866 (1982) (stating that district court judges in neighboring
counties successfully appealed salary disparities set forth in the New York
State Judiciary Law).
1027. 159 A.D.2d 163, 559 N.Y.S.2d 401 (3d Dep't 1990).

1028. Id. at 171, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 405.
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within the same judicial departments, unity of judicial interest
can be established.
In reaching its decision in Barth, the court found that unity of
judicial interest existed among the counties located within the
fourth department. 1029 The court, however, found higher salaries
in the remaining first and second department counties were
justified because "a significantly higher cost of living" provided
a rational basis for the geographic disparities. 1030
In determining the level of rational basis that its courts should
use for equal protection cases involving judicial salary disparity,
New
York
has
followed
federal
equal
protection
1031
1032
requirements.
In Weissman v. Evans,
the New York
Court of Appeals, relied on Reed v. Reed. 10 3 3 Reed supports the
United States Supreme Court's view that "[a] classification 'must
be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of
the legislation, so that all persons similarly [situated] shall be
treated alike.'"1034 Thus, Reed stands for the proposition that
even legislation that serves a state interest is forbidden by the
Equal Protection Clause unless it is supported by a fair and
substantial relationship to that interest. 1035
In conclusion, under the Equal Protection Clause of both the
United States and New York State Constitutions, legislation that
causes a disparity in judicial salaries requires that the law be
sustained if: a rational basis exists it can withstand a claim based
on evidence of geographic and cost of living differences, as well
1029. Barth,
1030. Id. at

_,

A.D.2d at _, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
607 N.Y.S.2d at 201-02.

1031. See Weissman, 56 N.Y.2d at 465-66, 438 N.E.2d at 400-01, 452
N.Y.S.2d at 867 (holding that there was no rational basis for the salary
disparity between district court judges in the neighboring counties of Suffolk
and Nassau which were both in the same department).
1032. Id.
1033. 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (stating that Iowa State code which provided that
males would be preferred over females to administer intestate estates was an
arbitrary classification).
1034. Id. at 76 (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415
(1920)).
1035. Id.
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as differences in judicial duties, functions, responsibilities and
caseloads.

10 3 6

607 N.Y.S.2d 357 (2d
1036. See, e.g., Mackston v. State, _ A.D.2d _,
Dep't 1994); Vogt v. Crosson, __ A.D.2d __, 606 N.Y.S.2d 57 (3d Dep't
1993); Davis v. Rosenblatt, 159 A.D.2d 163, 559 N.Y.S.2d 401 (3d Dep't
1990); Weissman, 56 N.Y.2d at 466, 438 N.E.2d at 400, 452 N.Y.S.2d at
867.
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